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What we can blame each other for1
1.
Theories of moral blameworthiness aim at identifying the conditions under which it is appropriate 
to blame a person. It is typically claimed that, in cases in which these conditions are fulfilled, the 
agent  is  blameworthy for  her  action.  But  the  thing we can  blame that  agent  for  is  not  further 
scrutinized.  In  this  paper  I  will  show that  this  is  a  mistake.  I  will  discuss  and reject  different 
attempts to identify the thing we can blame each other for in paradigmatic cases of blameworthiness 
before suggesting that, in such cases, we can appropriately blame each other for moving our bodies 
with  morally  objectionable  intentions.  This  account  makes  an  important  contribution  to  our 
understanding of moral blameworthiness and helps to defend the claims that ‘blameworthy’ implies 
‘wrong’ and that ‘being obliged to do X’ implies ‘being able to do X’.
2.
You are in the middle of a street and you do not realize that an onrushing car will very likely hit you 
if you do not move. In the first scenario, a rescuer shoves you with the intention of protecting you 
from the car. In the second scenario, a killer shoves you with the intention of ensuring that you will  
be hit by the car. But she accidentally shoves you too hard such that you are not hit. Both of them 
shove you and the physical pain they cause may be the same. But, other things being equal, it seems 
appropriate to thank the rescuer and to blame the killer.2 
Considerations such as these suggest that the intentions with which an agent acts at least 
partly determine whether it is appropriate to blame her or not. This idea can be formulated as the 
Simple Account of Blameworthiness: If a person who has a certain kind of control over her 
attitudes and behaviour acts with morally objectionable intentions, then it is appropriate to 
blame her.
The  Simple  Account  identifies  paradigmatic  cases  of  blameworthiness,  namely  those  in  which 
1 Sektion  Ethik/Metaethik,  29.09.2014,  XXIII.  Kongress  der  Deutschen  Gesellschaft  für  Philosophie  2014  in 
Münster.
2 You may also feel relief and something like gratitude (an analogon to what is often called agent regret in the case of  
one’s blamelessly causing harm) toward the killer. But blaming her seems to be appropriate, too.
2mentally normally developed adults act with morally objectionable intentions. But what is it that we 
can appropriately blame such a person for? Before discussing possible answers, I will briefly sketch 
what I take blame to be.
I am concerned with blame as an attitude which can, but does not have to be, expressed in 
actions or speech-acts. According to one account, our blaming a person in this sense should be 
understood as having certain emotions toward her such as resentment, indignation or, in the case of 
self-blame, guilt (Wallace 1994: ch. 2 & 3). According to another account, blaming a person is 
having a certain desire-belief pair toward her (Sher 2006: ch. 6). Others again take blame to be the 
revision of attitudes that constitute one’s moral relationship with the person blamed (Scanlon 2008: 
ch. 4). My arguments will be compatible with these accounts.
3. 
Let me call the thing we blame someone for the object of our blaming. My aim is to identify the 
object  of  appropriate  blame in  paradigmatic  cases.  At  first  glance,  it  seems obvious  that  it  is 
appropriate to blame a person who fulfils the conditions identified by the Simple Account for her 
action. However, there are two problems with this proposal. First, it is unclear what is involved in 
an agent’s action. It is debated, for example, whether the killer’s shoving me is identical with her 
rescuing me or not. Thus, different people who claim that an agent is blameworthy for her action 
can have very different ideas about what exactly she is blameworthy for. Second, as will become 
clear in a moment, depending on what one takes the killer’s action to be, the claim that she is  
blameworthy for her action can be quite implausible.
Leaving  the  concept  of  action  aside,  it  seems  to  be  initially  plausible  that  we  can 
appropriately blame people for intentionally moving their bodies in certain ways. And we can refer 
to such movements by saying that a person shoved us, that she stepped on our feet and so on. Let 
me call a person’s intentionally moving her body at a certain time her act. Neither the person’s 
intention nor the act’s consequences are part of the act. Some might claim that what I call a person’s 
act is just her action, but I will be neutral with regard to the nature of action. Thus, a first attempt to 
identify the object of appropriate blame is the 
Act Theory: If a person who has a certain kind of control over her attitudes and behaviour 
acts with morally objectionable intentions, then she is blameworthy for her acts.
According to the Act Theory, you can blame the killer for shoving you. The problem with this claim 
is  that  there is  nothing morally  questionable about  her  shoving you.  The killer  is  (very likely) 
3morally obliged to shove you because this will (very likely) save your life. But if shoving you is 
what she is obliged to do, then it seems highly implausible that she can be appropriately blamed for 
that thing. Imagine that you express your blame attitude toward the killer and ask her angrily: ‘How 
could you have shoved me?’ This would be inappropriate.
Another way to make the same point is this: Other things being equal, it is appropriate for a 
person to apologize for those things for which it is appropriate to blame her. This is so because 
apologizing is a natural counterpart of blame. But imagine that the killer apologizes for having 
shoved you. This would be odd. In general, the Act Theory implies that it is appropriate to blame 
people for things that are morally unquestionable. This is implausible.
One way to bypass the problems of the Act Theory is to say that the object of appropriate 
blame is the person’s intention. Thus, one could suggest an 
Intention  Theory:  If  a  person  who has  a  certain  kind  of  control  over  her  attitudes  and 
behaviour  acts  with  morally  objectionable  intentions,  then  she  is  blameworthy  for  her 
intentions.
This account plausibly implies that what we can blame the killer for is her intention to kill you. But 
the Intention Theory is incomplete.  What I  blame a person for who steps on my foot with the  
intention to hurt me is, it seems, not only that she intends to hurt me but also that she steps on my 
foot. And this seems appropriate. Thus, the object of appropriate blame is, in paradigmatic cases, 
not only the agent’s intention. 
Now, one might try to combine the Act and the Intention Theory by saying that the objects  
we are blameworthy for are our acts and intentions. Call this the
Act and Intention Theory: If a person who has a certain kind of control over her attitudes and 
behaviour acts with morally objectionable intentions, then she is blameworthy for her acts 
and intentions.
Imagine that a person steps on your foot and then shoves you in order to hurt you. The Act and 
Intention Theory says that that person can be blamed for  stepping on your foot,  shoving you and 
intending to hurt you. Recall that an agent’s act, as I understand it, does not involve the intention 
with which it is performed. Thus, the Act and Intention Theory implies that we can blame a person 
who performs several acts with an objectionable intention for completely distinct things. However, 
you would probably not blame the person who steps on your foot and shoves you in order to hurt 
4you for three completely distinct things. And it seems inappropriate to do so. The blameworthiness 
of such a person does not have three completely different sources. Her blameworthiness has one 
source or, perhaps, different sources that are closely connected. It seems important, for example, 
that the two acts the person performs are performed with the same objectionable intention to hurt 
you. A theory of what we can blame each other for should account for these connections. As the Act 
and Intention Theory rather obscures than reveals how the objects of appropriately blaming such a 
person are connected, we should reject it. 
4.
Three initially plausible attempts to identify the object of appropriate blame fail. Their problems 
have a common source: They treat the agent’s intentional body movement and her intention as two 
distinct objects of appropriate blame. But we should identify the object of appropriate blame, at 
least  in  the paradigmatic  cases  I  focus  on here,  as  the complex of  one’s  intention and the act 
performed with that intention. Or so I suggest.
Most of our verbs – such as ‘shoving’ – refer to the things we do without referring to the 
intentions with which we do them. But some verbs refer to the complex of the things we do and the 
intentions with which we do them – such as ‘lying’.  I suggest that the paradigmatic objects  of 
appropriate blame are complexes of this kind. Thus, I propose a
Complex  Theory:  If  a  person who has  a  certain  kind  of  control  over  her  attitudes  and 
behaviour  acts  with  morally  objectionable  intentions,  then  she  is  blameworthy  for 
performing acts with these intentions.3
What you can blame the killer for, according to the Complex Theory, is her shoving you in order to  
kill you. This is intuitively plausible. And you can blame the person who intends to hurt you for 
shoving you in order to hurt you and for  stepping on your foot in order to hurt you. This reveals 
how the things you can blame that person for are connected, namely by the intention that is part of  
both objects of blame. 
I do not claim that complexes of acts  and intentions are the only objects of appropriate 
blame.  My  thesis  is  that  the  Complex  Theory  identifies  what  we  are  blameworthy  for  in 
paradigmatic  cases.  Other things  we seem to be blameworthy for  include omissions,  intentions 
themselves, attitudes other than intentions, and, perhaps most clearly, the consequences of what we 
3 A complete theory of what we can blame each other for should, of course, say what is involved in a person’s  
intention. Fortunately, however, the Complex Theory is plausible and helps to illuminate the questions I will discuss 
in the following section, even though it is in this respect incomplete.
5do. Let me briefly discuss blameworthiness for consequences by considering the case of a murderer. 
A murderer has morally objectionable intentions, moves her body with these intentions – she 
pulls the trigger – and thereby causes another person’s death. So far, the Complex Theory says that 
she can be blamed for pulling the trigger in order to kill that person. But it also seems appropriate to 
blame the killer for her victim’s death. A natural extension of the Complex Theory says that what 
we appropriately blame the murderer for is the complex of her objectionable intention, her pulling 
the trigger, and some of that act’s consequences, above all the death of the victim.4 A complex of 
this  kind  can  be  referred  to  by  the  verb  ‘murdering’.  Thus,  what  can  be  called  the  Extended 
Complex Theory has the intuitive result that the murderer can be blamed for murdering her victim.
5.
The  preceding  discussion  adds  some  important  brushstrokes  to  our  picture  of  moral 
blameworthiness.  Moreover,  it  illuminates  other  important  philosophical  debates:  The Complex 
Theory helps to defend the claim that ‘blameworthy’ implies ‘wrong’ and the claim that ‘being 
obliged to do X’ implies ‘being able to do X’ against recent objections.
At first glance, it seems plausible that moral wrongness is one of the necessary conditions of 
moral blameworthiness. If there is nothing wrong with what you do, then it seems inappropriate to 
blame you.  T.  M.  Scanlon,  however,  maintains  that  blameworthiness  and wrongness  can  come 
apart: ‘[I]t can be appropriate to blame a person who has done what was in fact the right thing if he  
or she did it for an extremely bad reason’ (2008: 125). The killer case exemplifies this: She shoves 
you – which is (probably) what she should do – only because she intends to kill you. Thus, she 
seems to be blameworthy even though she did not do anything wrong. 
The Complex Theory says that what the killer is blameworthy for is shoving you in order to  
kill you. Assuming that shoving you is permissible in that situation, we should take a look at the 
killer’s intentions. And her intentions include the intention to kill you. Plausibly, killing you would 
be morally wrong. It follows that the killer’s intentions include the intention to act wrongly. Thus,  
even if the killer did not do anything wrong, she intended to do something wrong. 
This line of reasoning suggests a general defence of the claim that ‘blameworthy’ implies 
‘wrong’: The wrongness that is presupposed by blameworthiness does not have to be the wrongness 
of what the agent does. It suffices that there is something wrong with what she intends: The agent 
can intend to do something wrong, her having a certain intention can itself be wrong and her not 
having a certain intention can be wrong. This is, of course, not the place to argue for these claims in 
detail, but they seem to be promising and deserve further development.
4 What people are blameworthy for involves only some of their acts’ consequences because it is inappropriate to 
blame people for consequences they could not reasonably be expected to foresee. 
6The second claim the Complex Theory helps to defend is that ‘A is morally obliged to do X’ 
implies that ‘A can do X’ (henceforth: OIC). If OIC holds, then, a famous objection goes, A can 
make it the case that she is not obliged to do X by making it the case that she cannot do X. Some 
take this to be especially problematic because A thereby also seems to make it the case that she is 
not blameworthy for not X-ing. I modify a case from Ulrike Heuer (2010) in order to illustrate the 
point.5 Lilly  is  morally  obliged  to  attend  a  meeting  at  10  a.m.,  but  she  does  not  want  to  go. 
Therefore, she locks herself in a room at 9 a.m. – long before she ought to leave the house – and 
throws the key away. If OIC is true, then her obligation to attend the meeting at 10 a.m. expires 
when it becomes impossible for her to do so, which is at 9 a.m. At 10 a.m., her not attending the 
meeting is not wrong because there is no obligation that requires her to attend. And if Lilly’s not 
attending the meeting is not wrong, then she seems not to be blameworthy for it. But this is odd. It 
seems clear that ‘the other members of the meeting have a reason to be angry with Lilly because she 
was letting them down by not showing up’ (Heuer 2010: 239).
The objection is that OIC implies, together with other plausible assumptions, that one cannot 
appropriately blame Lilly for not attending the meeting. One can still blame her for locking herself  
in and for making it impossible to attend the meeting. But one cannot appropriately blame her for 
not attending the meeting itself. And this is, so the argument goes, a good reason to doubt OIC.
The Complex Theory implies that what Lilly’s colleagues can blame her for is,  perhaps 
among other things, locking herself in in order to not attend the meeting and throwing away the key  
in order to not attend the meeting. Thus, part of what they can blame Lilly for is her intention not to 
attend the meeting. Note that this is not ruled out by OIC. For at 9 a.m. when Lilly acted with that  
intention she was still obliged to attend the meeting. Thus, at 9 a.m. she intended to act wrongly and 
this intention is part of what she can be blamed for. But if it is appropriate to blame Lilly for acting 
with the intention not to attend the meeting, then I see no further reason to insist that it is also 
appropriate to blame her for not attending the meeting. 
In sum, OIC seems to rule out that it is appropriate to blame certain agents for certain things 
they do where we intuitively think that it is appropriate to blame those agents for those things. The 
Complex  Theory  helps  to  defend  OIC by  suggesting  that  those  agents  are  blameworthy  for  a 
complex that involves their intentions to do those things, even if they are not blameworthy for doing 
them. Thus, the Complex Theory helps to capture strong intuitions without giving up OIC.
6.
In  this  paper  I  discussed  what  we  can  blame  each  other  for  in  paradigmatic  cases  of  moral 
5 Heuer criticizes the claim that ‘having a normative reason to do X’ implies ‘being able to do X’, not OIC. But her 
argument would generalize against OIC as I understand it.
7blameworthiness. I proposed that the paradigmatic object of appropriate blame is moving one’s 
body with a morally objectionable intention. Finally, I showed that this account helps to illuminate 
important debates surrounding moral blameworthiness.6
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